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Abstract 
Regarding the relation of Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, scholars have 
been divided to two opposing groups: unitarists and developmentalists. While 
developmentalists try to prove that there are some noticeable and even fundamental 
differences between Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, the unitarists assert 
that there is no essential difference in there. The main goal of this article is to suggest 
that some of Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological principles change, both 
radically and fundamentally, between the early and middle period dialogues. Though 
this is a kind of strengthening the developmentalistic approach corresponding the 
relation of the early and middle period dialogues, based on the fact that what is to be 
proved here is a essential development in Plato’ ontology and his epistemology, by 
expanding the grounds of development to the ontological and epistemological 
principles, it hints to a more profound development. The fact that the bipolar and 
split knowledge and being of the early period dialogues give way to the tripartite and 
bound knowledge and benig of the middle period dialogues indicates the 
development of the notions of being and knowledge in Plato’s philosophy before the 
dialogues of the middle period. 
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Introduction 
The differences between two groups of the early and middle period dialogues 
have always been a matter of dispute. Whereas the developmentalists like Vlastos, 
Silverman (2002), Teloh (1981), Dancy (2004) and Rickless (2007)
1
 think that from 
the early to the middle dialogues Plato’s philosophy changes, at least in some 
essential points, the unitarists 
2
 like Kahn, Cherniss and Shorey believe that there 
happens no development and the differences must be taken as natural, ignorable and 
even pedagogic.
3
  
In his well-known article, Socrates contra Socrates in PLATO, Vlastos lists ten 
theses of difference between two groups of dialogues. The first group which includes 
Plato’s early dialogues he divides to 'elenctic' (Apology, Charmides, Crito, 
Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras and Republic I) and 
'transitional' (Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno) dialogues. 
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These transitional come after all the elenctic dialogues and before all the dialogues of 
the second group which compose Plato’s middle period dialogues, including (with 
Vlastos' chronological order) Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, 
Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus (1991, 46-49). Vlastos asserts strictly that his 
list of differences are 'so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply 
with one another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with 
Aristotole’s' (ibid, 46). Vlastos’ list of differences between two Socrateses4 is 
considered a view breaking sharply between the early and the middle dialogues.
5
 
Besides all ten differences between the two Socrateses in Vlastos’ list that can be 
supportive for our doctrine here, we intend to focus on some ontological as well as 
epistemological distinctions that have not completely been discussed hitherto. 
Contrary to the developmentalist theory of Vlastos, unitarian theory of Charles 
Kahn wishes to eliminate any substantial difference between the early and the middle 
dialogues. He distinguishes seven 'pre-middle' or 'threshold' dialogues including 
Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis and Euthydemus from the 
other Socratic dialogues which he calls 'earliest group' (1996, 41). The threshold 
dialogues, Kahn thinks, 'embarke upon a sustained project' that is to reach to its 
climax in the middle period dialogues, namely Phaedo, Symposium and Republic. 
Believing in that there is no 'fundamental shift'between the early and middle 
dialogues (ibid, 40), Kahn thinks the Socratic dialogues are just the 'first stage' with a 
'deliberate silence' towards the theories of later periods (ibid, 339). One of the 
reasons of the surprising fact that Plato gives no hint of the metaphysics and 
epistemology of the Forms in the early dialogues, he thinks, is the pedagogical 
advantages of aporia. He thinks that Plato 'obscurely', and mostly because of 
education, hinted to some doctrines and conceptions in his early dialogues and with 
the aim of clarifying them only in the later ones
6
 (ibid, 66). The seven threshold 
dialogues, Kahn asserts, 'had been designed from the first' to prepare the pupils and 
readers for the views expounded in the middle period dialogues
7
 (ibid, 59-60). 
To show that the differences of the two Socrateses
8
 of the early and middle 
period dialogue are in their onto-epistemological grounds and thence cannot be 
explained by a unitaristic view, we try to draw the ontological and epistemological 
principles of the early dialogues in the first part below in order to show, in the second 
part, that those principles have been developed in the middle period dialogues. 
 
A. The Onto-Epistemologic Principles of the Early Dialogues 
Socratic dialogues are paradoxical about knowledge because while being 
knowledge-oriented always searching for knowledge,
9
 they deny it and even never 
discuss it directly.
10
 Three elements of Socrates’ way of searching Knowledge 
throughout the early dialogues, i.e. Socratic 'what is X?' question, his disavowal of 
knowledge and his elenctic method combined together produce something like a 
circle which works, more or less, in the same way in these dialogues. Though this 
circle is an embaressing inquiry always resulting in ignorance instead of knowledge, 
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its motivation is surprisingly Socrates’ passionate enthusiasm for knowledge, an 
intensive love of wisdom. The starting point of this circle is Socrates’ confession of 
having no knowledge which might be explicitly asserted or presupposed, maybe 
because it was one of the famous characteristics of Socrates; a confession always 
paradoxically accompanied with his intense longing for knowledge (e.g., Gorgias 
505e4-5). Every time Socrates encounters with someone who thinks he knows 
something (οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι) (Apology 21d5) and tries to examine him. This 
examination seems to be the simplest one asking just what it is that he knows. 
Socrates’ elenchus, therefore, is always connected with 'what is X?' (τίς ποτέ 
ἐστιν) question, 11 a question that most of the early dialogues of Plato are concerned 
with; 'what is courage?' in the Laches, 'what is piety?' in Euthydemus, 'what is 
temperance?' in Charmides and 'what is beauty?' in Hippias Major. This question we 
call here 'Socratic question' and probably is the very question the historical Socrates 
used to employ,
 12
 is tightly interrelated with both his disavowal and his elenchus. He 
disclaims knowledge because he cannot find the answer to the question himself and 
he rejects others’ since they cannot offer the correct answer too. Every interlocutor 
can claim he knows X, if and only if he can answer the Socratic question. Otherwise, 
he is more of an ignorant than of a knower of τί ποτέ ἐστι X.  Knowing the answer 
to this question is, thus, knowledge’s criterion for Socrates. Having found out that he 
cannot answer what it is which he would claim to know, the interlocutor comes to the 
point Socrates was there at the beginning. The least advantage of this circle is that he 
becomes as wise as Socrates does about the subject, becoming aware that he does not 
know it. At the end of the circle they are both still at the beginning, not knowing 
what X is. So let us first take a glance at these three elements. 
Socratic disavowal of knowledge is strictly asserted in some passages.
13
 At 
Apology 21b4-5, Socrates says: 
 
I do not know of myself being wise at all (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα 
ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν)14 
 
Moreover, at 21d4-6: 
 
None of us knows anything worthwhile (καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι) …. I do not 
know (οἶδα) neither do I think I know. 
 
 In Charmides Socrates speaks about a fear about his probable mistake of 
thinking that he knows (εἰδέναι) something when he does not (166d1-2). The 
somehow generalization of this disavowal can be seen in Gorgias. After calling his 
disavowal 'an account that is always the same' (509a4-5), Socrates continues (a5-7): 
 
I say that I do not know (οἶδα) how these things are, but no one I have ever met, 
like now, who can say anything else without being absurd.  
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 At the end of Hippias Major (304d7-8), Socrates affirms his disavowal of 
knowledge of 'what is X?' this time about the fine:  
 
I do not know (οἶδα) what that is itself (αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν). 
Some other passages, however, made a number of scholars dubious about 
Socrates’ disavowal. Vlastos mentions Apology 29b6-7 as an evidence15: 'that to do 
wrong and to disobey one’s master, both god and men, I know (οἶδα) to be evil and 
shameful'. He thinks that if we give this single text 'its full weight' it can suffice to 
show that Socrates does claim knowledge of a moral truth (1985, 7). Vlastos’ claim 
is not admittable since it would be too strange, I think, for a man like Socrates to 
violate his disavowal claim just after emphasizing it. We can see his claim just before 
the already mentioned passage: 
 
And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what 
one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that 
I differ from the majority of men and if I were to claim that I am wiser than 
anyone in anything it world be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge 
(οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς) of  things in the underworld, so I do not think I have (οὐκ 
εἰδέναι) (Apology 29b1-6) 
  
Vlastos tries to solve what he calls the 'paradox' of Socrates’ disavowal of 
knowledge distinguishing the 'certain' knowledge from 'elenctic' knowledge (1985, 
11) and thinking that when Socrates avows knowledge, we must perceive it as an 
elenctic knowledge, a knowledge its content 'must be propositions he thinks 
elenctically justifiable' (ibid, 18).
16
 Irwin’s solution is the distinction of knowledge 
and belief. He approves that Socrates does not 'explicitly' make such a distinction, 
but still thinks that Socrates’ 'test for knowledge would make it reasonable for him to 
recognize true belief without knowledge, and his own claims are easily understood if 
they are claims to true belief alone' (1977, 40). While I agree with Vlastos up to a 
point, I strongly disagree with Irwin about the early dialogues. As I will try to show 
below, we are not permitted to consider any kind of distinction within knowledge in 
Socratic dialogues because only one category of knowledge is alluded to there and 
the distinction of knowledge and belief thoroughly belongs to the second Sorcates. 
Although no kind of distinction can be admittable here, I think Vlastos’ distinction 
can be accepted only if we regard it as a distinction between knowledge, which is 
unique and without any, even incomparable, rival, and a semi-idiomatic and ordinary 
one that is a necessary requirement for any argument, and thus, unavoidable even for 
someone who does not claim any kind of knowledge. An apparent evidence of this is 
Gorgias 505e6-506a4: 
 
I go through the discussion as I think it is (ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν), if any of you 
do not agree with admissions I am making to myself, you must object and refute 
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me. For I do not say what I say as I know (οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ 
λέγω) but as searching jointly with you (ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν). 
 
 The minimal degree of knowledge everyone must have to take part in an 
argument, conduct it and use the phrase "I know" when it is necessary is what 
Socrates cannot deny. We can call it elenctic knowledge only if we agree that it is not 
the kind of knowledge that Socrates has always been searching, the one that can be 
accepted as the answer of Socratic 'what is X?' question. His disavowal of knowledge 
is applied only to the knowledge which can truly be the answer of Socratic question 
and pass the elenctic exam; a knowledge that, I believe, is never claimed by first 
Socrates.  
Socrates conducts his method of examining his interlocutors’ knowledge, our 
second element here, by almost the same method repeated in Socratic dialogues. That 
whether we are allowed to regard all the examinations of Socrates in the early 
dialogues as based on the same or not has been a matter of dispute. Vlastos himself 
(1994, 31) distinguished Euthydemas, Lysis, Menexenns and Hippias Major from the 
other Socratic dialogues because he thinks Socrates has lost his faith to elenchus in 
there. Irwin (1977, 38) distinguishes Apology and Crito where Socrates’ own 
convictions is present. Contrary to some scholars like Benson (2002, 107) who take 
elenchus in all the Socratic dialogues as a unique method, Michelle Carpenter and 
Ronald M. Polansky (2002, 89-100) argue pro the variety of methods of elenchus. 
Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (2002, 145-160) even reject such a 
thing as Socratic elenchus which can gather all of the Socrates’ various arguments 
under such a heading. There can be no solution for the problem of elenchus, they 
think, is due to 'the simple reason that there is no such thing as 'the Socratic 
elenchos"'(p.147). Though we consider elenchus a somehow determined process and 
a part of Socratic circle in the early dialogues, all we assume is that whatever 
differences it might have in different dialogues, it has the same onto-epistemological 
principles and, thus, we are not going to take it necessarily as a unique method. This 
method sets out to prove that the interlocutors are as ignorant as Socrates himself is. 
That whether elenchus is constructive, capable of establishing doctrines as Vlastos 
(1994) or Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 20-21) believe or not
17
 is another issue to 
which this paper is not to claim anything. What is crucial for our discussion here is 
that elenchus does not reach to the very knowledge Socrates is looking for. This is 
strictly against Irwin who thinks that not only elenchus leads to positive results, 'it 
should even yield knowledge to match Socrates’ conditions'(1977, 68, cf. 48). He 
does not explain where and how they really yield to that kind of knowledge.  
He explains his elenctic method in his apology in the court (Apology 21-22), that 
how he used to examine wise men, politicians, poets and all those who had the 
highest reputation for their knowledge and every time found that they have no 
knowledge. If we accept, as I strongly do, that Socrates’ disavowal of his knowledge 
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is not irony, it might seem more reasonable to agree that the process that has that 
disavowal as its first step cannot be irony as well. 
The key of the circle which can explain why Socrates disclaims knowledge and 
how he can reject others’ claim of having any kind of knowledge lies in the third 
element, Socratic question. In Hippias Major (287c1-2), Socrates asks: 'Is it not by 
Justice that just people are Just? (ἆρ᾽ οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι). He 
insists at 294b1 that they were searching for that by which (ᾧ) all beautiful things are 
beautiful (cf. b4-5, 8). At Euthyphro 6d10-11 it is said that the Socratic question is 
waiting for 'the form itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος) by which (ᾧ) all the pious actions are 
pious; and at 6d11-e1: 
 
Through one form (που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ) impious actions are impious and pious actions 
pious. 
 
  Since the X itself is that by which X is X, knowing 'X itself' is the only way of 
knowing X. It is probably because of this that Socrates makes the distinction between 
the ousia as a right answer to the question and effect as a wrong one: 
 
I am afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is (τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι 
ποτ᾽ ἐστίν) you did not wish to make clear its nature itself (οὐσίαν … αὐτοῦ) 
to me, but you said some effect (πάθος) about it.  (Euthp. 11a6-9) 
 
1. Knowledge of what X is  
Now it is time to look for the onto-epistemological principles
18
 of Socratic circle 
and its three elements. It cannot reasonably be expected from the first Socrates to 
present us explicitly and clearly formulated principles of his onto-epistemology
19
 
when such explications cannot be found even in the second Socrates who has some 
obviously positive theoris. Since there must be some principles underlying this first 
systematic inqury of knowledge, we must seek to them and be satisfied with 
elicitation of the first Socratas’ principle. What will be drawn out as his principles 
cannot and must not, thus, be taken as very fix and dogmatic principles. Some very 
slightest principles and grounds suffice for our purposes here. The first principle that 
is the prima facie significance of the Socratic question and his implementation of all 
those elenctic arguments I call the principle of 'Knowledge of What X is' (KWX): 
 
KWX To know X, it is required to know what X is. 
 
Aristotle (Metaphysics 1078b23-25, 27-29, 987b4-8) takes Plato’s τί ἐστι 
question as seeking the definition of a thing that is the same as historical Socrates’ 
search but applying to a different field. That Plato’s 'what is X?' question was a 
search for definition became the prevailed understanding of this question up to 
now.
20
 I am going neither to discuss the answer of Socratic question
21
 nor to 
challenge taking it as definition. What I am to insist is that knowledge is attached 
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firmly to the answer of the question: Knowledge of X is not anything but the 
knowledge of what X is. It entails, certainly, the priority of this knowledge to any 
other kind of knowledge about X but it also has something more fundamental about 
the relation of knowledge and Socratic question. Socrates’ exclusive focus on the 
answer of his question can authorize the consideration of such an essential role for 
KWX in his epistemolgoy. The total rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge when 
they are unable to answer the question can be regarded as a strong evidence for it. 
Socrates’ elenctic method and his rejection of others’ knowledge in the early 
dialogues, which all end aporetically with no one accepted as knower and nothing as 
knowledge, prevent us from finding any positive evidence for this. We have to be 
content, therefore, of negative evidences which, I think, can be found wherever 
Socrates rejects his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are not able to give an 
acceptable answer to his 'what is X?' question. 
  
2. Bipolar Epistemology  
Socrates’ rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge has another epistemological 
principle as its basis. Let me call this principle Bipolar Epistemology' (BE): 
  
BE  There is no third way besides knowledge and Ignorance. 
 
 BE says that about every object of knowledge there are only two subjective 
statuses: knowledge and Ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but 
that he is ignorant of knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. This 
means that BE is presupposed here. Socrates’ elenchus and his rejection of 
interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of the fact that 
he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The first Socrates 
never let anyone partly know X or have a true opinion about it, as he would not let 
anyone know anything about X when he did not know what X is.
22
  
 
3. Bipolar Ontology  
The principle of BE in first Socrates’ epistemology is parallel to another 
principle in his ontology. Plato’s bipolar distinction between being and not being is 
as strict and perfect as his distinction between knowledge and ignorance. This 
principle I shall call the principle of 'Bipolar Ontology' (BO): 
  
BO Being is and not being is not. 
  
BO is apparently the same with the well-known Parmenidean Principle of being 
and not being (cf. Diels-Kranz (DK) Fr. 2.2-5). Euthydemus’ statement against the 
possibility of false knowledge can be good evidence for this principle: 
 
The things which are not surely do not exist (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα … ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ 
ἔστιν). (Euthydemus 284b3-4) 
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He continues (b4-5): 
 
There is nowhere for not being to be there (οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα 
ἐστίν).  
 
That BE does not let true opinion as a third option besides knowledge and 
ignorance seems to be related to BO’s rejecting a third option besides being and not 
being, which is itself the basis of the impossibility of false belief. Socrates’ elaborate 
discussion of the problem of false belief in Theatetus that leads to a more decisive 
discussion and finally to some solutions in Sophist can make our consideration of BO 
for the first group of dialogues authentive. 
 
4. &5. Split Knowledge and Split Being  
The fourth principle I shall call the principle of 'Split Knowledge' (SK): 
 
SK Knowledge of X is separated from any other knowledge (of anything else) 
as if the whole knowledge is split to various parts. 
 
This Principle is hinted and criticized as Socrates’ way of treating with 
knowledge in Hippias Major:
23
 
 
But Socrates, you do not contemplate the entireties of things, nor do people you 
have used to talk with (τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ᾽ 
ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). (301b2-4) 
 
Contrary to Rankin who regards the passage as 'antilogical, almost eristic in tone 
rather than presenting a serious philosophy of being' (1983, 54), I think it can be 
taken as serious. Hippias criticizes Sorcates that he does not contemplate (σκοπεῖς) 
the entireties of things (ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων), a critique which Socrates is not its 
only subject but all those whom Socrates accustomed to talk with (ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ 
εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). This last phrase, I think, extends this critic beyond this 
dialogue to other Socratic dialogues. Hippias’ use of the perfect tense of the verb 
ἔθω (to be accustomed) is a good evidence of this extension. We can get, thus, these 
ἐκεῖνοι as Socrates’ interlocutors in his other dialogues that hints that this criticism 
has the epistemological groundings of the previous dialogues as its subject. What 
ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι points to is that Hippias does not have in 
mind Socrates’ way of treating things only in this dialogue, but he is also criticizing 
Socrates’ way throughout his dialogues.   
At 301b4-5, Socrates and his interlocutors’ way of beholding things is described 
as such: 
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You people knock (κρούετε) at the fine and each of the beings (ἕκαστον τῶν 
ὄντων) by taking each being cut up in pieces (κατατέμνοντες) in words (ἐν 
τοῖς λόγοις). 
  
This leads us to our next principle that is parallel to, and the ontological side of, 
SK, the principle of 'Split Being'(SB): 
 
SB  Everything (being) is separated from any other thing as if the 
whole being is split to many beings. 
 
Socrates and his interlocutors and thus, as we saw, the Socratic dialogues are 
accused to regard everything as it is separated from all other things. This separation 
is en tois logois that, I think, can reasonably be taken as saying that Socratic 
dialogues (it refers of course to the dialogues before Hippias Major) cut up all things 
which have the same name/definition from all other things and try to understand 
them separately, without considering other things that are not in their logos. They, 
for example in Hippias Major, are cutting up to kalon and try to understand what it 
and all others inside this logos are by separating it from all other things. This is 
directed straightly against Socratic question and the way Socratic dialogues follow to 
find its answer, every time separating one logos. As Meyer (1995, 85) points out, 
every question 'presupposes that the X in question in a logos is something' and 'every 
answer to every question aims at unity' (84).  
The critique of Hippias Major is, therefore, at the same time a critique of SK and 
SB. It is also a critique of KWX because it is only based on KWX that Socratic 
dialogues could search for the answer of 'what is X' question supposing that knowing 
what X is is enough for the knowledge of X. SK and KWX are absolutely 
interdependent. 
What Socrates and all his previous interlocutors have neglected in Socratic 
dialogues, Hippias says, was 'continuous bodies of being' (διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς 
οὐσίας) (301b6). Either this theory actually belongs to the historical Hippias as it is 
being said
24
 or not, it is strictly criticizing SB. We have the same phrase with 
changing sūma to logos some lines later at 301e3-4: διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας. 
Although this theory that can be observed as both an ontological and an 
epistemological theory is rejected by Socrates (301cff.), it is still against first 
Socrates’ onto-epistemological principles and might let us look at what is rejected as 
Socratic prineple.  
 
6. Knowledge is of Being  
The sixth principle that I think is presupposed by the first Socrates, is the 
'Knowledge of Being' Principle (KB):  
 
KB Knowledge is of Being. 
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This principle is obviously the source of the problem of false knowledge, a very 
important problem throughout Plato’s philosophy. We face this problem maybe for 
the first time in Euthydemus.
25
 In less than 20 Stephanus’ pages, 276-295, we are 
encountered with different interwoven problems about knowledge
26
, all grounded in 
the problem of false opinion. Having challenged the obvious possibility of telling lies 
at 283e, at 284 Euthydemus discusses it saying that the man who speaks is speaking 
about 'one of those things that are (ἓν μὴν κἀκεῖνό γ᾽ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων)' (284a3) 
and thus speaks what is (λέγων τὸ ὄν) (a5). He must necessarily be saying truth 
when he is speaking what is because he who speaks what is (τὸ ὄν) and the things 
that are (τὰ ὄντα) speaks truth (τἀληθῆ λέγει) (a5-6). This is based on 
Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being which Euthydemus 
restates (284b3-4) and we mentioned discussing BO principle above. The things that 
are not are nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ) and there is no possibility for anyone to do 
(πράξειεν) anything with them because they must be made as being before anything 
else can be done, which is impossible
27
 (b5-7). The words, then, are of things that 
exist (εἰσὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι) (285e9) and as they are (ὡς ἔστιν) (e10). 
The result is that no one can speak of things as they are not. It is this impossibility of 
false speach that is extended to thinking (δοξάζειν) at 286d1 and leads to the 
impossibility of false opinion (ψευδής … δόξα) (286d4). The general conclusion is 
asserted at 287a extending this impossibility to actions and making any kind of 
mistake. Not only knowledge is of being but speech, thought and action are of being 
simply because of the fact that nothing can be of not being. 
 
B. First Socrates’ Principles in the Middle Period Dialogues 
Out of what were presupposed or criticized mostly in five dialogues, Euthyphro, 
Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Laches and Charmides, we tried to draw the first 
Socrates’ principles. Our inquiry here is directed to find out the fate of these 
principles in the three dialogues of the middle period, Meno, Phaedo and Republic. 
To do this, first we ought to check the situation of Socratic circle in these dialogues. 
The Socratic circle that was predominant in the early dialogues, does not look like a 
circle here anymore though they certainly have some features in common. Meno, 
Phaedo and Republic II-X are not committed to the principles of the circle
28
 and the 
whole circle in disrupted in them.  
The difference of the two Socrateses towards acquiring knowledge is obvious.
29
 
The Socrates of Meno, Phaedo and Republic is evidently more self-confident that he 
can get to some truths during his arguments as he does. They are in their first 
appearance, as almost all other dialogues, committed to Socrates’ disavowal. All of 
them try to keep the shape of the Socratikoi Logoi genre, which is committed to the 
historical Socrates’ way of discussion; a dramatic personage who is to challenge his 
interlocutors, ask them and refuse the answers. Nevertheless, the fact is that what we 
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have in common between two groups of dialogues is mostly a dramatic structure. 
Whereas the first group’s arguments are based on Socrates’ disavowal and lead to no 
positive results, the second group is decisively going to achieve some positive 
results. The aim of the first Socrates was to show others that they are ignorant of 
what they thought they knew. The new Socrates of Meno, on the opposite, makes so 
much efforts to show that the slave boy has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς 
δόξαι) about the things that he does not know (οἶδε) (85c6-7). Despite his lack of 
knowledge, he has true opinions nevertheless. The way from these true opinions to 
knowledge, as Socrates states, is not so long. These true opinions are now like a 
dream but 'can become knowledge of the same things not less accurate than 
anyone’s' (οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων) (c11-d1), if they 
be repeated by asking the same questions. 
The most outstanding text regarding Socrates’ disavowal30 is Meno 98b where 
he explicitly claims knowledge: 
 
And indeed I also speak as (ὡς) one who does not know (εἰδὼς) but is guessing 
(εἰκάζων). However, [about the fact] that true opinion and knowledge are 
different, I do not altogether expect (δοκῶ) myself to be guessing (εἰκάζειν), 
but if I say about anything that I know (εἰδέναι) -which about few things I say- 
this is one of the things that I know (οἶδα).31 (98b1-5) 
  
This passage is very significant about Plato’s disavowal of knowledge. There 
can hardly be found, I think, anywhere else in Plato’s corpus where Socrates speaks 
about his knowledge of something as such. He says first that he speaks as someone 
who does not know. This ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω comparing with what he used to say 
in the first group, οὐκ οἶδα, has this added ὡς. Socrates does not claim strongly 
anymore that he does not know anything but speaks only as someone who does not 
know. He needs this ὡς not only because he is going to accept that he does know 
some, though few, things immediately after this sentence, but also because he needs 
his previous disavowal to be loosened from Meno on. He does not merely say here 
that he knows something. It is then different from the examples mentioned before 
which could be taken as idiomatic or at least not emphatic. Socrates’ remarkable 
emphasis on distinguishing εἰδέναι from εἰκάζειν departs it from all other passages 
where he says only he knows something. Moreover, he claims definitely that he has 
knowledge about few (ὀλίγα) things.32  
From the early to the middle dialogues, Socrates’ attitude to knowledge has 
totally renewed its face. He brings forth a new concept, true opinion, and he does not 
speak of knowledge as he used to before; the rough, perfect and unachievable 
knowledge of the first group has turned to something more smooth, realistic and 
achievable. Comparing with the early dialogues that did not set out from the first to 
reach positive results, the middle ones are extraordinarily and surprisingly positive
33
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and hence destroy the basis of the Socratic circle. The questions and answers are 
purposely directed to some specific new theories; most of them are not directly 
related to the topics or the main questions of the dialogues. They are suggested when 
Socrates draws the attention of the interlocutor away from the main question because 
of the necessity of another discussion. Even if the main question remains 
unanswered, we have still many positive theories, prominently of metaphysical type. 
These theories are so abundant and dominant in these dialogues, especially Phaedo 
and Republic, that one might think that they may appear to be arbitrarily sandwiched 
in there. This helps dialogues to keep their original Socratic structure while they are 
suggesting new theories. Hence, the Socratic question of 'what is X?', though is still 
used to launch the discussion, is loosened and is forgotten for most part of the 
dialogues. Meno that has first a differently formulated question, 'can virtue be 
taught?', leads finally to the Socratic question of 'What is virtue?'. Phaedo is 
dedicated to the demonstration of the immortality of soul and the life after death 
without having a central Socratic question. The case of Republic is more 
complicated. The first book, on the one hand, has all the criteria of a Socratic circle: 
its 'what is justice?' question, Socrates’ strong disavowal (e.g. 337d-e), his rejection 
of all answers and coming back to the first point without finding out any answer. 
This Book, considered alone, is a perfect Socratic dialogue, as many scholars regard 
it as early and separated from other books. The books II-X are, on the other hand, far 
from implementing a Socratic circle. They have still the 'what is justice?' question as 
their incentive leading question, but they are, in most of the positive doctrines and 
methods that encompass the main parts, ignoring the question. Even these books that, 
I believe, are the farthest discussions from the Socratic circle are so cautious not to 
break the Socratic structure of the dialogue as long as it is possible. What is changed 
is not the structure of the dialogue but the ontological and epistemological grounds 
based on which new theories are suggested. 
 
1. Knowledge of the Good  
We can clearly see in the second group of dialogues that the KWX principle  
loses the place it had before in our first group. It is not, of course, rejected, but still 
we cannot say that it has the same situation. KWX that was based on Socratic 
question, as we discussed before, was the leading principle of the first Socrates’ 
epistemology and of the highest position. Other epistemological principles, SK 
directly and BE indirectly, were relying on Socratic question and therefore on KWX. 
Such a position does not belong to KWX from Meno on. What makes it different in 
the second Socrates is another principle that is needed it not only as its 
complementary principle but also as what is more fundamental. Plato, then, does not 
reject KWX in this period, but, it seems, he transcends to another more basic 
principle; a principle we shall call the principle of 'Knowledge of the Good' (KG): 
 
KG Knowledge of X requires knowledge of the Good. 
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Whereas all the dialogues of our first group are free from any discuscon about 
KG, it bears a very important role in the second group so as becomes the superior 
principle of knowledge in Republic. Trying to solve the problem of teachability of 
virtue, Socrates says that it can be teachable only if it is a kind of knowledge because 
nothing can be taught to human beings but knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) (Meno 87c2). 
The dilemma will be, then, whether virtue is knowledge or not (c11-12) and since 
virtue is good, we can change the question to: whether is there anything good 
separate from knowledge (εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον 
ἐπιστήμης) (d4-5). Therefore, the conclusion will be that if there is nothing good 
which knowledge does not encompass, virtue can be nothing but knowledge (d6-8). 
What let us discuss KG as an epistemological principle for the second Secrates is 
the relation he tries to establish between knowledge and the Good which, though is 
alongside with the mentioned thesis and the idea of virtue as knowledge, goes much 
deeper inside epistemology asking to regard the Good as the basis of knowledge. The 
effort of Phaedo cannot succeed in establishing the Good as the criterion of 
explanation and knowledge since, I think, it needs a far more complicated ontology 
of Republic where Socrates can finally announce KG. What is said in Republic is 
totally compatible with Phaedo 99d–e and the metaphor of watching an eclipse of the 
sun. In spite of the fact that we do not have adequate knowledge of the Idea of the 
Good, it is necessary for every kind of knowledge: 'If we do not know it, even if we 
know all other things, it is of no benefit to us without it' (505a6-7).  The problem of 
our not having sufficient knowledge of the Idea of Good is tried to be solved by the 
same method of Phaedo 99d-e, that is to say, by looking at what is like instead of 
looking at thing itself (506d8-e4). It is this solution that leads to the comparison of 
the Good with sun in the allegory of Sun (508b12-13). What the Good is in the 
intelligible realm corresponds to what the sun is in the visible realm; as sun is not 
sight, but is its cause and is seen by it (b9-10), the Good is so regarding knowledge. 
It has, then, the same role for knowledge that the sun has for sight. Socrates draws 
our attention to the function of sun in our seeing. The eyes can see everything only in 
the light of the day being unable to see the same things in the gloom of night (508c4-
6). Without the sun, our eyes are dimmed and blind as if they do not have clear 
vision any longer (c6-7). That the Good must have the same role about knowledge 
based on the analogy means that it must be considered as a required condition of any 
kind of knowledge: 
 
The soul, then, thinks (νόει) in the same way: whenever it focuses on what 
is shined upon by truth and being, understands (ἐνόησέν), knows (ἔγνω) 
and apparently possesses understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν). (508d4-6) 
 
Socrates does not use agathon in this paragraph and substitutes it with both 
aletheia and to on.
34
 He links them with the Idea of the Good when he is to assert the 
conclusion of the analogy: 
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That which gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to 
the knower, you must say, is the Idea of the Good: being the cause of knowledge 
and truth (αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας)35 so far as it is known 
(ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ). (508e1-4) 
  
Knowledge and truth are called goodlike (ἀγαθοειδῆ) since they are not the 
same as the Good but more honoured (508e6-509a5). KG, which had been implicitly 
contemplated and searched in Phaedo, is now explicitly being asserted in Republic. 
As what was quoted clearly proves, this principle is the very one which we can 
observe as the most fundamental principle of the second Socrates in Republic, 
corresponding to the role KWX had in the first Socrates.  
The Form of the Good in Republic, of which Santas speaks as 'the centerpiece of 
the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato’s 
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and …' (1983, 256) much more can be said. 
Plato’s Cave allegory in Book VIII dedicates a similar role to the Idea of the Good. 
The Idea of the Good is there as the last thing to be seen in the knowable realm, 
something so important that its seeing equals to understanding the fact that it is the 
cause of all that is correct and beautiful (517b). Producing both light and its source in 
visible realm, it controls and provides truth and understanding in the intelligible 
realm (517c). 
 
2. Tripartite Epistemology  
BE is thoroughy rejected in the second Socrates and substituted by its opposite, 
the principle of 'Tripartite Epistemolgy' (TE): 
 
TE Opinion is an epistemological status between knowledge and ignorance. 
  
BE of the first Socrates was denying any third way besides knowledge and 
ignorance which was the foundation of Socratic circle without which Socrates could 
not reject his interlocutors’ possessing any kind of knowledge. We cannot say, 
however, that the first Socrates had a third epistemological status in mind but 
rejected it. Such a status was unacceptable for him so that one can say that he would 
reject any kind of such status if suggested. There were only two possibilities about 
knowledge: either one knows something or he does not know it. TE, thus, was not 
the first Socrates’ discovery and, I think it is not the second Socrates’discovery. All 
we can see in our second group of dialouges is that he uses this principle as an 
already demonstrated one. 
Having examined the slave boy in Meno for the prupose of showing the working 
of recollection, it truns out that he has some opinions in him while he still does not 
know. Without trying to prove it, Socrates takes this as the distinction between 
knowledge and opinion:  
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So, he who does not know (οὐκ εἰδότι) about what he does not know (περὶ ὧν 
ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ)36 has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the same 
things he did not know (περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε) (85c6-7). 
 
The same distinction is set between ὀρθὴν δόξαν and ἐπιστήμην at 97b5-6 ff. 
(also cf. 97b1-2: ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων … ἐπιστάμενος). He connects then their 
difference to the myth of Daedalus, the statue that would run away and escape. So 
are true opinions, not willing to remain long in mind and thus not worthy until one 
ties them down by αἰτίας λογισμῷ (98a3-4). Socrates says that this tying down is 
anamnesis. We face, in Phaedo, the same relation is settled between knowledge as 
the process of being tied down and getting the capability to give an account, on the 
one hand, and anamnesis, on the other hand. When a man knows, he must be able to 
give an account of what he knows (Phaedo 76b5-6) and since not all people are able 
to give such an account, those who recollect, recollect what once they learned (76c4). 
Although the distinction between knowledge and opinion is not explicitly used in 
Phaedo, referring to the parallel link between knowledge plus account and 
anamnesis in Phaedo and Meno, one can say that those who cannot recollect are not 
able to give account and, thus, are in a state of opinion. What is said at Phaedo 84a, 
though not yet a definite distinction between knowledge and opinion, makes a 
distinction between their objects so as we can agree that it is presupposed. The soul 
of the philosopher, Socrates says, follows reason, stays with it forever and 
contemplates the divine, which is not the object of opinoin (ἀδόξαστον) (84a8, cf. 
Meno 98b2-5). 
The distinction of knowledge and belief in Republic has a significant difference 
with what we discussed in Meno and Phaedo since the distinction of Meno was based 
on anamnesis and thus more an epistemological distinction. Even in Phaedo that we 
do not have any elaborate discussion about the distinction, the only hint to the matter 
at 76 is bound to the theory of anamnesis. In addition to the relation of the distinction 
with this theory, there is another evidence that does not permit us to consider the 
distinction as an ontological distinction. Let’s see Meno 85c6-7: 
 
So, he who does not know about what he does not know has within himself true 
opinions about the same things he did not know (τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν 
ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε). (85c6-7) 
 
This last sentence persists that the objects of knowledge and true opinion are the 
same. What Socrates is to say here is that whereas he does not know X he has true 
opinion about the same X. I think Socrates’ sentence that the slave boy οὐκ εἰδότι 
ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ and his restatement of it by saying περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ 
οἶδε is because he wants to emphasize that the slave boy who does not know, has 
true opinion about the same thing. Socrates could say this just with using τούτων 
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and there would be no necessity to bring περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ for οὐκ εἰδότι if he 
did not want to emphasize.  
 
3. Tripartite Ontology  
The distinction between knowledge and true opinion in Republic, on other side, 
has nothing to do with recollection, but is based on an ontological principle, 
'Tripartite Ontology' (TO): 
 
TO  There are things that both are and are not. 
 
This principle I confine, among our three dialogues of the second group, to 
Republic not extended to Meno and Phaedo, is obviously the opposite of BO. 
Speaking about the lovers of sights and sounds in the fifth book, Socrates 
distinguishes them from philosophers because their thought is unable to understand 
the nature of beautiful itself besides beautiful things (476a6-8) and hence they can 
only have opinions. The philosopher who, on the contrary, believes in beautiful itself 
and can distinguish it from beautiful things (476c9-d3), has knowledge because he 
knows, contrasting others who have opinion because they only opine (d5-6). Since 
those whose knowledge were degraded as opinion will complain about Socrates’ 
such calling their thought, he provides them the following argument (476e7-477b1): 
 
- Does the person who knows, knows (γιγνώσκει) something (τὶ) or nothing 
(οὐδέν)? 
- He knows something (τί). 
- Something that is (ὂν) or is not (οὐκ ὄν)? 
- Something that is (ὂν) for how could something that is not be known (πῶς γὰρ 
ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη)? 
- Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine 
it, what completely is (παντελῶς ὂν) is completely knowable (παντελῶς 
γνωστόν) and what is in no way (μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ) is in every way 
unknowable (πάντῃ ἄγνωστον).  
- A most adequate one. 
- Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be (ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ 
εἶναι), won’t it be intermediate (μεταξὺ) between what purely is (εἰλικρινῶς 
ὄντος) and what in no way is (μηδαμῇ ὄντος)? 
- Yes, it’s intermediate. 
- Then as knowledge (γνῶσις) is set over what is (τῷ ὄντι), while ignorance 
(ἀγνωσία) is of necessity set over what is not (μὴ ὄντι) mustn’t we find an 
intermediate between ignorance (ἀγνοίας) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) to be 
set over the intermediate, if there is such a thing? 
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From the third status of being we must reach to the third status of knowledge. 
The simple reading of this text can be an existential reading, taking the "is" of the 
mentioned sentences as existence. The problem is that when it is said that there is 
something that both is and is not reading "is" existentially, it sounds too bizarre to be 
acceptable. It cannot easily be understandable to have something as both existent and 
non-existent at the same time. This problem arose so many debates and led many 
scholars to reject the existential reading of "is" and suggest some other readings like 
predicative or veridical readings. I think though Plato’s complicated ontology of 
Republic cannot be correctly understood by a simple existential reading, this "is" 
cannot be free from existential sense of being and, thus, cannot be reduced to just a 
predicative or veridical sense of being.  
 
4. Bound Knowledges  
In addition to KG, the Good is also the basis of another principle in the second 
Socrates, namely the principle of 'Bound Knowledge' (BK): 
 
BK Knowledge of everything is bound to the knowledge of the Good. 
 
We distinguished BK from KG because we want to insist, in BK, on what had 
not been insisted upon in KG, that is, the binding role that the Good plays in the 
second Socrates, contrasting the absence of such a role in the first Socrates. Socrates 
remembers, in Phaedo, his wonderful keen on natural philosophers' wisdom when he 
was young. The origin of this enthusiasm was Socrates’ hope to know the cause of 
everything as they used to claim. When he was searching the matters of his interest 
on their basis, Socrates says, he became convinced he can get no acceptable answer 
from them and found himself blind even to the things he thought he knew before. 
One day he hears Anaxagoras’ theory that 'it is Mind that arranges and is the cause of 
everything (ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος)' (Phd. 
97c1-2 cf. DK, Fr.15.8-9, 11-12, 12-14) and thinks that he can finally find what he 
has always expected, i.e. something which can explain all things. What I intend to 
show here is that what makes Socrates hopeful is that Anaxagoras’ theory tries 1) to 
explain all things by one thing and 2) this explanation is understood by Socrates as if 
it is based on the concept of the Good.  
That Socrates was searching for one explanation for all things can be proved 
even from what he has been expecting from natural philosophers. The case is, 
nonetheless, more clearly asserted when he speaks about Anaxagoras’ theory. In 
addition to διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος of 97c2 mentioned above, we have 
τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον (c3-4) and τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα 
κοσμεῖν (c4-5) all emphasizing on the cause of all things (πάντα) which can 
clearly prove that one of the reasons which caused Socrates to embrace it delightfully 
was its claim to provide the cause of  all things by one thing. Another reason was that 
Anaxagoras’ Mind, at least in Socrates’ view, was attempting to explain everything 
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by the concept of the Good. This connection between Mind and Good belongs more 
to the essential relation they have in Socrates’ thinking than Anaxagoras’ theory 
because there are almost nothing about such a relation in Anaxagoras. The reason for 
Socrates’ reading can be that Mind is substantially compatible with Socrates’ idea of 
the relation between good and knowledge. Both the thesis 'no one does wrong 
willingly' and the theory of virtue as knowledge we pointed to above are evidences of 
this essential relation. Nobody who knows that something is bad can choose or do it 
as bad. The reason, when it is reason, that means when it is as it should be, when it is 
wise or when it knows, works only based on good-choosing. In this context, when 
Socrates hears that Mind is considered as the cause of everything, it sounds to him 
like this: good should be regarded as the basis of the explanation of all things. We 
see him, thus, passing from the former to the latter without any proof. This is done in 
the second sentence after introducing Mind: 
 
I thought that if this were so, the arranging Mind would arrange all things and put 
each thing in the way that was Best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ). If one then wished 
to find the cause of each thing by which it either perishes or exists, one needs to 
find what is the best way (βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν) for it to be, or to be acted 
upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about 
this and other things, what is the most excellent (ἄριστον) and best 
(βέλτιστον). The same man must inevitably also know what is worse (χεῖρον), 
for that is part of the same knowledge. (97c4-d5) 
  
This passage is a good evidence of Socrates’ leap from Anaxagoras’ Mind to his 
own concept of the Good that can explain why Socrates found Anaxagoras theory 
after his own heart (97d7). Mind is welcomed because of its capability for 
explanation on the basis of good to 'explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is 
better (ἄμεινον), and that it was better (ἄμεινον) to be so' (97e1-3).37  
What Socrates thought he had found in Anaxagoras can indicate what he had 
been expecting from natural scientists before. Socrates could not be satisfied with 
their explanations because they were unable to explain how it is the best for 
everything to be as it is. It can probably be said, then, that it was the lack of the 
unifying Good in their explanation that had disappointed him.
38
 We must insist that 
we are discussing what Socrates thought that Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind should 
have been, not about Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. Phaedo 97c-98b, is not 
about what Socrates found in Anaxagoras but what he thought he could find in it. On 
the contrary, it should also be noted that it was not this that was dashed at 98b, but 
Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. It was Anaxagoras’ fault not to find out how 
to use such an excellent thesis (98b8-c2, cf. 98e-99b). Socrates gives an example to 
show how not believing in 'good' as the basis of explanation makes people be 
wanderers between different unreal explanations of a thing. His words δέον 
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συνδεῖν (binding that binds together) as a description for the Good we chose as the 
name of BK principle: 
     
They do not believe that the truly good and binding binds and holds them 
together (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν 
οἴονται). (99c5-6)  
 
Having in mind Plato’s well-known analogy of the sun and the Good at 
Republic 508-509, we can dare to say that his warning of the danger of seeing the 
truth directly like one watching an eclipse of the sun in Phaedo (99d-e) is more about 
the difficulty of so-called good-based explanation than its insufficiency, a difficulty 
which is precisely confirmed in Republic (504e-505a, 506d-e). Moreover, BK is 
asserted in a more explicit way in the Republic, where the Good is considered not 
only as a condition for the knowledge of X, as was noted above discussing KG, but 
also as what binds all the objects of knowledge and also the soul in its knowing them. 
At Republic VI, 508e1-3, when Socrates says that the Form of the Good 'gives truth 
to the things known and the power to know to the knower (τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν 
ἀποδιδὸν)', he wants to set the Good at the highest point of his epistemological 
structure by which all the elements of this structure are bound. This binding aspect of 
the Good is by no means a simple binding of all knowledges or all the objects of 
knowledge, but the most complicated kind of binding as it is expected from the 
author of the Republic. The kind of unity the Good gives to the different knowledges 
of different things is comparable with the unity which each Form gives to its 
participants in Republic: as all the participants of a Form are united by referring to 
the ideas, all different kinds of knowledge are united by referring to the Good. If we 
observe Aristotle's assertion that for Plato and the believers of Forms, the causative 
relation of the One with the Forms is the same as that of the Forms with particulars 
(e.g. Metaphysics 988a10-11, 988b4), that is to say the One is the essence (e.g., ibid, 
988a10-11: τοῦ τί ἐστὶν, 988b4-6: τὸ τί ἢν εἶναί) of the Forms besides his 
statement that for them One is the Good (e.g., ibid, 988b11-13) the relation between 
the Good and unity may become more understandable.  
Since the quiddity of the Good (τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν) is more than 
discussion (506d8-e2), we cannot await Socrates to tell us how this binding role is 
played. All we can expect is to hear from him an analogy by which this unifying role 
is envisaged, the sun. The kind of unity that the Good gives to the knowledge and its 
objects in the intelligible realm is comparable to the unity that the sun gives to the 
sight and its objects in the visible realm (508b-c). The allegory of Line (Republic VI, 
509d-511), like that of the Sun, tries to bind all various kinds of knowledges. The 
hierarchical model of the Line which encompasses all kinds of knowledge from 
imagination to understanding can clearly be considered as Plato’s effort to bind all 
kinds of knowledges by a certain unhypothetical principle. The method of hypothesis 
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starts, in the first subsection of the intelligible realm, with a hypothesis that is not 
directed firstly to a principle but a conclusion (510b4-6). It proceeds, in the other 
subsection, to a 'principle which is not a hypothesis' (b7) and is called the 
'unhypothetical principle of all things' (ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν) 
(511b6-7). This παντὸς must refer not only to the objects of the intelligible realm 
but to the sensible objects as well. Plato does posit, therefore, an epistemological 
principle for all things, a principle that all things are, epistemologically, bound and, 
thus, unified by. 
 
5. Bound Beings  
The ontological aspect of BK we shall call the principle of 'Bound Beings' (BB): 
 
BB Being of all things are bound by the Good. 
 
We saw in our principle of Split Being (SB) how the first Socrates was criticized 
because of his approach to split being and separate each thing from other things. The 
principle of Bound Beings intends to make the things more related, a duty which is 
done again by the Good. In the allegory of Sun, there are two paragraphs that 
evidently and deliberately extend the binding role of the Good to the ontological 
scene: 
 
You will say that the sun not only makes the visible things have the ability of 
being seen but also coming to be, growth and nourishment. (509b2-4) 
 
This clearly intends to remind the ontological role the sun plays in bringing to 
being all the sensible things in order to display how its counterpart has the same role 
in the intelligible realm (b6-10): 
 
Not only the objects of knowledge (γιγνωσκομένοις) owe their being known 
(γιγνώσκεσθαι) to the Good, but also their existence (τὸ εἶναί) and their being 
(οὐσίαν) are due to it, though the Good is not being but superior to it in rank and 
power. 
  
That the Good is here represented as responsible for being of things in addition 
to their being known means, in my opinion, that Plato wants to posit BB in addition 
to BK. The allegory of Cave at the very beginning of the seventh Book (514aff.) can 
be taken as another evidence. The role of the Good, one might say, is confined to the 
intelligible realm because it is asserted that the role the Good plays in this realm is 
corresponding to that of the sun in the visible realm. The fact that Plato wants to 
observe the Good also as the ontological cause of the sensible things is obvious from 
his saying, in the allegory of Cave, that the Form of the Good 'produces light and its 
source (τὸν τούτου κύριον) [i.e. the sun] in the visible realm' (517c3). We can 
conclude, then, that the ontological function of the Good is not confined to the 
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intelligible realm in which it is the lord and provides truth and understanding (c3-4) 
because it is also responsible to produce τὸν κύριον of light.39  
  
6. Proportionality of Being and Knowledge  
Insofaras BE and BO principles of the first Socrates gave way to TE and TO 
principles of the second Socrates, we cannot expect him to preserve KB  in the same 
way as it was in the first Socrates. The new tripartite ontology and epistemology 
necessitates some modifications in KB which results in the principle of 
'Proportionality of Being and Knowledge' (PBK): 
 
PBK To every class
40
 of being there is a proportionate category of knowledge. 
 
This principle, of course, does not entail the refutation of KB and thus is not 
kind of rejecting PBK but only a more complicated version of it. Based on PBK, we 
can still agree that knowledge is of being (KB) but the issue is that since none of the 
concepts of knowledge and being in the second Socrates are as simple as they were 
for the first Socrates, we need a more complicated principle for their relation here. 
Although from Meno 97a where the distinction of knowledge and true opinion is 
drawn out in the second group of the dialogues, we can expect a new relation, it is 
articulated in its most complete way in Republic and specifically in the allegory of 
Line. All the beings are divided there hierarchically to four classes, to each of them 
belongs a class of knowledge: imagination to images, belief to the sensible things 
(more correctly: the things of which they[in previous class] were images (ᾧ τοῦτο 
ἔοικεν)), thought to mathematical objects (?) and understanding  to the Forms and 
the first principle. The degree of clarity that each of the classes of knowledge shares 
in (σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν) is proportionate to the degree that its 
object shares in truth (ἀληθείας μετέχει). (511e2-4) 
 
Conclusion 
From the six onto-epistemilogical principles of the first Socrates, four principles turn 
to their opposite in the middle period dialogues. While bipolar epistemology and 
ontology of the early dialogues give place to tripartite epistemology in the middle 
period dialogues and tripartite ontology in Republic, the split knowledge and being of 
the first Socrates are inclined to be substituted by bound knowledges and bound 
beings in the second Socrates and specifically in Republic. Not all our system of 
principles in this article is necessarily determinative. Either they are rightly 
formulated or not, our result would not be vulnerable if we accept that 1) making the 
distinction of knowledge and belief, 2) accepting the being of not being and 3) trying 
to bind both being and knowledge by the concept of the Good happens only in 
middle period dialogues, having been absent in the early ones. These are the 
favourite results all those somehow arbitrary and even oversimplified principles were 
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to illustrate; that there is kind of a development in the epistemological as well as the 
ontological grounds of Plato’s philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1  See also: Prior (1985, 10-37) 
2 Gerson (2002, 85) distinguishes between three groups of antidevelopmentalists which 
include unitarists, those who take the dialogues protreptic and agnosticistic. 
3  Being a unitarist, Cormack (2006, 15) thinks that the early dialogues are "protreptic". He 
(ibid, 9-10) points to the fact that the "historical interpretation" which tries to refer the 
distinction of the early and middle dialogues to the distinction between Socrates and Plato 
and the developmental interpretations are not mutually exclusive. By calling Plato’s thought 
'the unity of growth and development', Allen (1970, 157), it seems, tries to reconcile the 
developmentalist with unitarist approach. 
4
 The ten theses point orderly to these differences: 1) a moral philosopher vs. a metaphysician; 
2) separated Forms and Soul in the latter; 3) elenctical vs. demonstrative philosophy; 4) 
complex and tripartite model of the soul in second Socrates; 5) second Socrates' mastership 
in mathematics; 6) being populist vs. elitist; 7) second Socrates’ elaborate political theory; 8) 
second Socrates' metaphysical grounding in love for the transcendent Form of beauty; 9) 
practical and ethical vs.  mystical and contemplated religion and 10) adversative vs. didactic 
philosophy (1991, 47-49). Robinson (1953, 61) points to their difference in respect of 
method and methodology.  
5 Fine agrees with Vlastos that there are some 'genuine' differences, but she does not agree 
with such a wide difference: 'Plato is more of a Socratic than Vlastos allows' (1993, 83). She 
thinks that Vlastos 'overemphasizes' on differences (ibid, 68). 
6 Allen, on the contrary, thinks that the difference between theories in the early and middle 
period dialogues is not between what is tentative and what is thought and came to a 
conclusion (1959, 174). 
7 E.g., Kahn (1996, 339) thinks that the trio of Laches, Euthyphro and Meno 'is best read 
together as a well-planned essay on definition'. Therefore, the search of essence in dialogues 
is 'future-oriented' form the start. While there is some truth in Mackay’s view that we should 
substitute the pedagogical or mental growth with a dramatic and dialectical development, 'an 
elaboration of many themes within a single theme; the clarification of an original insight 
through opposition and new perspective' (1928, 14), I do not think it is enough for being a 
unitarist in Plato (ibid, 11). Even a developmentalsit might share this view. 
8 None of these Socrateses I take as historical Socrates. The first Socrates of this paper means 
only the Socrates of the early period dialogues specially that of Laches, Hippias Major, 
Euthyphro, Euthydemus and Charmides while the second Socrates is that of Meno, Phaedo 
and Republic. Contrary to Vlastos who takes the Socrates of the early dialogues as the 
historical Socrates (1991, 77), an idea in which many scholars like Silverman (2002,28) 
share with him, I think while we can be sure that the first Socrates is closer to the historical 
Socrates, there might arise many problems if we ascribe either the dramatic character or the 
suggested theories in the early dialogues to the historical Socrates. Therefore, my position is 
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like that of Benson (2000, 7) that it is best not to assume the theories as merely belonging to 
the historical Socrates or the writer of dialogues himself.  
9  Kirkland notes that Socrates wants to bring about some kind of 'non-epistemic but 
nonetheless true and properly human way' of his question, thus, does not aim 'moral 
knowledge' (2012, 8), goes far from the overall epistemic spirit of the early dialogues.   
10 Vlastos (1957, 229) thinks that it is not accidental since heretofore the investigation of 
knowledge is 'a dependency of ontological or cosmological inquiry'. As Vlastos correctly 
points out, Charmides 165c is where Socrates comes so close to this investigation though 
still avoids it. About his reference to Euthydemus 282e, I cannot see any evidence.  
Euthdemus 288d-e is not as close as the mentioned passage of Charmides. The same can be 
said about 292d. 
11
 Cf. Euthyphro 6e3-4, Hippias Major 286d1-2, Laches 190a4, 191d9  
12  It is generally assumed that this question was the very question historical Socrates used to 
employ which has also Aristotle (1078b27-30) as its evidence. Nonetheless, we are not to 
claim this by so calling the question. The doubt Weiss (2009) brings forth about the role of 
the Socratic question based on the absence of the question in Apology seems unnecessary 
either we take it about historical Socrates or Plato’s Socrates.Though hinting to the process 
of elenchus (21-22), Apology is not to set a Socratic investigation and does not thus need to 
use the Socratic question. This can be the reason why it does not mention it. We may 
reasonably assume that the elenchus he speaks there about must have the question in use. 
13 E.g., Laches 186 d8-e2, 200e3-4 (εἰδώς, … μὴ εἰδότε) Hippias Major 286c-e, 304d7-8, 
Apology 21b 4-5, d4-6, 29b1-7, Gorgias 505e6-506a4, 509a4-7, Charmides 165b4-c2, 
166d1-2, Euthyphro 5a1-2, Meno 71a6-7 (οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετὴ 
τυγχάνω εἰδώς), 71b3 (οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν), Symposium 216d2-4 
14 Though I used Cooper’s (ed.) translation (1997) for Plato’s texts, I was not totally 
committed to it and changed it based on the Greek text wherever a more strict translation 
was needed. 
15
 He also mentions (1985, 7-10) some other texts like Republic 351a5-6, Protagoras 357d7-
e1, Crito 48a5-7 and Gorgias 479e8, 486e5-6, 512b1-2.  
16 Criticizing Vlastos’ distinction, Matthews (2006, 113) notes that Socrates neither does speak 
of two different senses of knowledge nor says 'I know and I don’t know'. The distinctions of 
expert and nonexpert or latent and manifest knowledge (cf., e.g., Woodruff (1995) , Taylor 
(2008) and Matthews (2008)) does not essentially differ from that of Vlastos. The trouble 
with all such suggestions is that, as Richard Bett points out, Plato 'gives no indication of 
wishing to multiply senses of the various words translated by "know"'(2011, 226). Pointing 
to tekhnê as a kind of knowledge, he suggests the distinction of the subject matters instead of 
senses of knowledge.  
17
 Gonzalez, for instance, thinks that in most of the early dialogues, protreptic is the only 
positive function of elenchus (2002, 161-182). 
18 Using the word "principle" for what I am going to discuss the ontology and epistemology of 
Socrates in both his early dialogues and his middle ones might be misleading. It is not to 
mean more than "ground" or "approach" and thus is not to be emphasized. 
19 This does not give us, however, the permission to agree with Woodruff (1978, 101-102) that 
Plato’s early dialogues are 'innocent of metaphysics' or 'ontologically neutral' or with Vlastos 
(1991, 15) that "no epistemological theory at all can be ascribed to Socrates". Trying to 
refute such views, Benson (2000, 3, n. 1) provides a list of those who think that the historical 
Socrates or Socrates of the earlier dialogues is no epistemologist. The reason for the fact that 
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Socrates must have had some kind of metaphysics is best suggested by Silverman (2002, 28-
30). Despite the fact that Socrates is not interested in articulating a metaphysical theory, he 
thinks that Plato’s middle period metaphysics cannot have been emerged ex nihilo and must 
be considered as his reaction to the difficulties of the metaphysics of Socrates.    
20 Fine, for example, asserts 'To know what F is is to know the answer to the question "what is 
F?", that is, to know the real definition of the nature of F-ness' (2003, 2) which she calls 'the 
principle of the priority of knowledge of a defintion'
20
(ibid). Iindicating specifically to 
Laches 190b-c, calls it 'the epistemological priority of definitional knowledge'  (ibid, 25). 
Kahn articulates this priority of definition as such:'If you do not know at all what X is, you 
cannot know anything about X' (1996, 180-181). 
21 Think that the answer of the Socratic question is definition, some scholars insist on its being 
a real definition, contrasting, for instance, with nominal definition (cf. Wolfsdorf, 2005, 24), 
while some others regard the meaning of the concept as the answer. Wolfsdorf (ibid, 21) 
thinks that when Socrates, for example in Protagoras and Hippias Major, asserts that X must 
be something (τί), it means that he seeks a real definition and its identity and not its meaning. 
Vlastos (1973) believes the question to be constitutive and not semantic and thus does not 
agree with meaning as the aim of search. 
22 Euthdemus 293c–294a can be considered as a problem related to KWX and BE principles. 
Socrates states that if you are knowing, then you know (οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἶ, εἴπερ 
ἐπίστασαι) (293c2-3) and concludes that you must necessarily know all things if you are 
knowing (οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε ὄντα) (c4). The 
impossibility of being and not being the same (d4) is Socrates’ reason to conclude: 'If I know 
one thing, I know all (εἴπερ ἓν ἐπίσταμαι, ἅπαντα ἐπίσταμαι) since I could not be 
knowing and not knowing (ἐπιστήμων τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων) at the same time' (d5-6). 
23 Thinking that Hippias Major does not commit Plato to the ontology of the middle period, 
Woodruff believes that from Hippias Major to the middle period dialogues there is some 
kind of proceeding from 'ontological neutrality toward a transcendental ontology' (1988, 
212). As it will be discussed below, while we agree with the first point, the ontological 
neutrality in not tenable. 
24 Kerferd (1981, 47) argues pro the idea. Rankin (1983, 55) does not agree with him. It is not, 
however, included in the fragments of Dielz’ collection. I think that if it is to be accepted, 
Plato’s use of the theory as a critique of Socrates’ onto-epistemology can be used more 
strongly in favor of our analysis.  
25
 Most of the dialogues treating with this problem such as Theatetus and Sophist are observed 
as late dialogues in the 20
th
 century chronologies. The case of Gorgias is different. It 
mentions the issue without discussing it. While it accepts that there can be false conviction 
besides true conviction (πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής) (454d5), false knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη … ψευδὴς) (d6-7) is strongly prohibited. Gorgias accepts the first simply by 
saying Ναί and rejects the second strongly by saying Οὐδαμῶς.  
26
 The problems of:  learning both what you know and what you do not know (276d), 
possibility of telling lies (283e), impossibility of speaking things that are not (285e-286a, 
287a), impossibility of false speaking (286c), impossibilty of false thinking and opinion 
(286d) and the problem of knowing nothing or all things. (293c-294a)  
27 Ctesippus’ suggestion at 248c7-8 is surprisingly missed by Dionysodorus. He says that the 
problem could be solved if we accept that the one who tells lies speaks things that are in a 
way (τρόπον τινὰ) and not indeed as it is the case (ὥς γε ἔχει). This suggestion is close to 
what will be the final solution to the problem in Sophist. 
28
 The only part in these dialogues that is constructed, like the early dialogues, based on 
Socratic circle is the first Book of the Republic. At 351a6, nonetheless, it is decisively said 
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that 'no one can now be ignorant of this (οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο ἀγνοήσειεν) that injustice 
is ignorance'.  
29
 Vlastos explains this difference in his third pair of theses by distinguishing between elenctic 
versus demonstrative knowledge; while the first keeps disavowal claim, the second is 
confident that he can find knowledge. (1991, 76)  
30
 We have some other less important passages where it seems that he avows knowledge of 
some truths.  Phaedo 63c, though does not use the word 'knowing' is noteworthy. Socrates 
asserts that if he ever insists (διισχυρισαίμην) on anythings about the matters related to the 
after-death life, he insists on his going to his good masters, Gods, after death (63c2-4). 
31 καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων: ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ 
δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην 
ἂν εἰδέναι—ὀλίγα δ᾽ ἂν φαίην—ἓν δ᾽ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα. 
32
 The subject of Socrates’ avowal, i.e. the difference between knowledge and true opinion, 
can explain why Socrates’ most considerable claim of knowledge is asserted here. This 
distinction will be not only the basis of all his later onto-epistemology but also his theory of 
Forms. Timaeus (51d-e), for instance, regards this distinction as what can be a sufficient 
proof for the existence of Forms. 
33 Vlastos speaks of the 'demise of the elenchus' before the middle period dialogues and in 
three dialogues of Euthydemus, Lysis and Hippias Major (1994, 29-33) because of the 
'abandonment of adversary argument as Socrates’ method of philosophical investigation' 
(p.30). He thinks that Socrates is both the author and the critic of the theories of these 
dialogues and they are, thus, uncontested by the interlocutors. 
34 The relation of the Good on the one hand and being and truth on the other hand remains, I 
think, ambiguous at least in Republic. All that we hear from Plato here is that the Good is 
beyond them. I cannot understand what kind of evidence Cynthia Hampton had to conclude 
that truth in Republic is 'likewise a Form and a part of the Good' and also an 'ontological 
notion' (1998, 239). 
35 One might agree with Politis that by the things that are capable of being known, Plato has in 
mind, 'at least primarily', the other ideas (2010, 102). Cooper's translation (ed.) of ὡς 
γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ ('it is an object of knowledge') cannot be satisfactory.  
36 While some of the translators do not translate περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ (e. g., Cooper (ed.)) 
maybe because they think it does not add anything new to the meaning, I think it must be 
translated.  
37 This is also clear from 98a1-b3:  
If he showed me those things I should be prepared never to desire any other 
kind of cause. I was ready to find out in the same way (οὕτω … ὡσαύτως) 
about the sun and the moon and …., how it is best (πῇ ποτε ταῦτ᾽ ἄμεινόν 
ἐστιν) that each should act or be acted upon. I never thought that Anaxagoras, 
who said that those things were directed by Mind, would bring any other cause 
for them than that it was best for them as they are (βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως 
ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει). Once he had given the best for each (ἑκάστῳ 
βέλτιστον) as the cause for each and the general cause of all, I thought he 
would go on to explain the common good for all (τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν 
ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν). 
38
 Politis, conversely, thinks it is not true to say Socrates introduced this new method of 
explanation because of the fact that they were not good-based. 'Socrates’ complaint against 
traditional explanation', he says, 'is independent of and prior to his becoming hopeful about 
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good–based ones.' (2010, 99) If we have to accept that what he means by ‘good-based’ 
explanation is the same with what Socrates had in mind about Anaxagoras’ theory, Politis is 
misleading here. Socrates’ hope for Anaxagoras’ theory was, I believe, owing to the fact that 
he had been disappointed with natural philosophers’ explanations which justifies the 
suggestion to take that which is included in this new theory as the same with what was 
absent before.  It is also misleading, I think, to call Socrates' theory teleological if we mean 
by this some kind of explanation that must be considered besides other kinds of explanation 
as, for example, Taylor thinks. (1998, 11) If we behold the essential relation between the 
Good and the knowledge and observe the fact that the good is here considered as the basis of 
explanation, we cannot be satisfied with putting it besides other kinds of explanations only as 
one kind. 
39
 Socrates’ statement at 517c1-2 that the form of the Good 'is the cause of all that is right and 
beautiful in everything (πᾶσι πάντων) is also noticeable. 
40
 I do not insist on the word here. I used 'class' to avoid the possible interpretations which 
words like 'level' and 'degree' might arise.  
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